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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Arrowpoint Capital Corp. (“Capital”) appeals an order 
of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware denying a preliminary injunction in this action for 
trademark infringement and unfair competition.  Invoking the 
Lanham Act and Delaware state law, Capital sought to enjoin 
Arrowpoint Asset Management, LLC; Arrowpoint Partners 
GP, LLC; Arrowpoint Partners GP2, LLC; Arrowpoint 
Fundamental Opportunity Fund, LP; and Arrowpoint 
Structured Opportunity Fund, LP (collectively “AAM”) from 
using a logo or word mark employing the name “Arrowpoint” 
in connection with any investment-related products and 
services.  Because the District Court’s ruling rests on an 
overly narrow interpretation of the kind of confusion that is 
actionable under the Lanham Act, we will vacate and remand. 
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I. Background 
 
 A.  Factual Background1 
 
 Capital is a Delaware holding company, whose 
subsidiaries, Arrowood Indemnity Company and Arrowood 
Surplus Lines Insurance Company, provide insurance and 
investment-related financial services throughout the United 
States under the Arrowpoint Capital name.  Capital says that 
it began managing and investing assets derived from 
insurance policy premiums in 2007 and that its “primary 
source of income is the investment of its reserves in fixed 
income securities.”  (Opening Br. at 5.)  According to Capital, 
                                              
 1 In an appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary 
injunction, we typically view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party.  See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales 
Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“In an appeal from the granting of a preliminary 
injunction, the appellate court will view the facts most 
favorable to the plaintiff and all factual conflicts will be 
resolved in favor of the prevailing party.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 
958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998) (reviewing the denial of a 
preliminary injunction and explaining that under the clear-
error standard of review, “an appellant must demonstrate that 
even in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence 
was insufficient to support the findings”); Maritrans GP Inc. 
v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. 
1992) (noting that, in reviewing a lower court’s reversal of a 
preliminary injunction order, the facts are “taken in a light 
most favorable to … the winner at the trial court level”).  
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it earned more than one million dollars from investment-
related services provided to third-party clients for whom it 
had executed nearly 1,000 trades between 2007 and 2011.  
Capital claims to manage about two billion dollars in assets, 
at least as of 2011, and to have executed over 1,200 trades for 
its own portfolio between 2007 and 2011.  Currently, Capital 
owns six trademarks registered with the United States Patent 
& Trademark Office for insurance, investment, and 
consulting services, all of which feature the words 
“Arrowpoint Capital” or the 
logo .2  It also has a 
pending registration for investment management services, as 
to which AAM has filed an opposition.3  Capital says that it 
                                              
 2 The trademarks are:  1) Arrowpoint Capital, Reg. No 
3,484,564, a word mark registration for insurance-related 
services; 2) Arrowpoint Capital, Reg. No. 3,484,563, a logo 
registration for insurance-related services; 3) Arrowpoint 
Capital, Reg. No. 3,948,120, a word mark registration for 
business auditing services; 4) Arrowpoint Capital, Reg. No. 
3,948,121, a logo registration for business auditing services; 
5) Arrowpoint Capital, Reg. No. 4,132,173, a word mark 
registration for employee retirement plan administration and 
consulting services; and 6) Arrowpoint Capital, Reg. No. 
4,132,172, a logo registration for employee retirement plan 
administration and consulting services.  Registrations 3 
through 6 were awarded after the District Court briefing had 
concluded.   
 
 3 The proceedings before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office pertaining to the seventh registration – 
Serial Number 77,836,169 – have been stayed pending the 
outcome of this litigation.   
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markets its investment services through presentations, 
sponsorships, speaking engagements, and attendance at 
industry conferences, and it expended approximately 
$390,000 between 2007 and 2011 doing so.     
 
 The AAM entities, which use the 
logo , include an investment management 
company, two private investment funds, commonly called 
“hedge funds,” and the hedge funds’ general partners – all of 
which are limited liability companies or limited liability 
partnerships organized under the laws of Delaware with their 
principle places of business in Denver, Colorado.  The AAM 
entities were formed between December 2007, when AAM 
first began using the mark “Arrowpoint,” and April 2009.  
They provide investment-related services, including 
individual investment management services and 
administration services for hedge funds.  AAM claims to 
manage over $1.5 billion in assets and to serve “high net 
worth individuals, companies operating primarily for the 
benefit of wealthy individuals, family foundations, or trusts.”  
(App. at 6.)   
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
 On February 26, 2010, Capital filed a complaint in the 
District Court, asserting four claims:  (1) trademark 
infringement under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1114; (2) unfair competition and false advertising under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a);4 (3) 
                                              
 4 Although Capital labeled its second claim as one for 
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trademark infringement and misappropriation under Delaware 
common law; and (4) violation of the Delaware Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2532.  That same 
day, Capital filed a motion for a preliminary and permanent 
injunction to prevent AAM “from using the ‘Arrowpoint’ 
name in any form or the [AAM] logo as a trade name, 
trademark, or domain name in the advertising, marketing, 
promotion, sale, offering for sale, or distribution of [AAM’s] 
products and services.”  (App. at 113-114.)   
 
 The parties engaged in discovery for several months 
until, on August 6, 2010, Capital moved for a scheduling 
order and a scheduling conference, which AAM opposed for 
reasons that are unclear.  Two months later, the District Court 
issued a scheduling order allowing for limited additional 
discovery and setting a briefing schedule for the injunction 
motion.  In March 2011, Capital notified the District Court 
that briefing was complete and requested a hearing on its 
injunction motion.   
 
 Over seventeen months later, on August 20, 2012, 
Capital filed its first motion to supplement the record, seeking 
to submit affidavits describing nine additional alleged 
instances of alleged actual confusion that took place after the 
                                                                                                     
both unfair competition and false advertising under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, that was only a label.  As the 
District Court noted, Capital “only briefed and referenced 
statutory language related to unfair competition.”  Arrowpoint 
Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. CV 10-
161-GMS, 2014 WL 2123572, at *3 n.9 (D. Del. May 20, 
2014).  Accordingly, the Court only addressed the unfair 
competition claim. 
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parties had completed briefing on the injunction motion.  
Capital filed a second motion to supplement the record on 
April 15, 2013, seeking to submit evidence – again in the 
form of affidavits – of seven more instances of alleged actual 
confusion that had occurred since the first motion to 
supplement had been filed.   
 
 About four months later, on August 13, 2013, Capital 
submitted a letter to the District Court inquiring about the 
status of its pending motions.  The District Court then issued 
an order, on September 18, 2013, denying the first motion to 
supplement, and another on March 25, 2014, denying the 
second motion to supplement.  On May 20, 2014, more than 
four years after Capital moved for a preliminary injunction, 
the District Court denied Capital’s motion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  This appeal followed.  
 
II.  Discussion5  
 
 Capital argues that the District Court erred in denying 
its motion for a preliminary injunction and the related 
motions to supplement the record, and it further asserts that, 
based on the time taken to consider its preliminary injunction 
motion, the case should be reassigned to a different judge on 
remand.  We address those arguments in turn. 
                                              
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292.   
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 A.  Motion for a Preliminary Injunction6  
 
 Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary 
remedy” and “should be granted only in limited 
circumstances.”  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve 
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[O]ne of the goals of the 
preliminary injunction analysis is to maintain the status quo, 
defined as the last, peaceable, noncontested status of the 
parties.”  Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 
920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  The test for such relief is familiar.  
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer 
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting 
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the 
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such 
relief.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 
(3d Cir. 2004).  The “failure to establish any element [of that 
test] renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.”  
                                              
 6 We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny 
a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.  
Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 
170 (3d Cir. 2001).  Any findings of fact are reviewed for 
clear error and conclusions of law are subject to plenary 
review.  Id.  “An abuse of discretion exists where the district 
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law 
to fact.”  Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J. v. Black Horse 
Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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NutraSweet Co. v. Vit–Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 
(3d Cir. 1999).   
 
 Typically, then, the first step in the analysis is to 
consider whether the party seeking the preliminary injunction 
is likely to succeed on its underlying legal claims, which, in 
this case, center on trademark infringement.7  “To prevail on 
a claim for trademark infringement or unfair competition 
under the Lanham Act, the owner of a valid and legally 
protectable mark … must show that a defendant’s use of a 
similar mark for its goods ‘causes a likelihood of confusion.’”  
Kos, 369 F.3d at 708-09 (quoting A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. 
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 
                                              
 7 Capital challenged in the District Court both AAM’s 
use of the word mark “Arrowpoint” and the AAM logo.  See 
supra p.7.  As to the logos, the District Court ruled that they 
were so dissimilar in appearance and impression that they 
were not confusingly similar.  On appeal, Capital offers no 
argument that the Court’s ruling with respect to the logos was 
incorrect, and, thus, it has waived any argument against that 
ruling.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[U]nder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3) and 
(5) and Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 28.1(a), appellants 
are required to set forth the issues raised on appeal and to 
present an argument in support of those issues in their 
opening brief.  It is well settled that if an appellant fails to 
comply with these requirements on a particular issue, the 
appellant normally has abandoned and waived that issue on 
appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
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2000)).8  In determining whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion, we have adopted a non-exhaustive list of factors, 
commonly referred to within our Circuit as the “Lapp 
factors,” based on an early case in which they were set forth.  
Id. at 709; see also Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 
460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983).  Because some of the Lapp factors as 
initially stated were “not apposite for directly competing 
goods,” we later “adapted [them] to make them applicable 
whether the products directly compete or not.”  A & H, 237 
F.3d at 212-13.  As adapted, the factors are as follows: (1) the 
degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the 
allegedly infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner’s 
mark; (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicating 
the care and attention one expects would be given when 
making a purchase; (4) the length of time the alleged infringer 
has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion 
arising; (5) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting the 
mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the 
goods are marketed through the same channels; (8) the extent 
to which the target markets are the same; (9) the perceived 
relationship of the goods, whether because of their near-
identity, similarity of function, or other factors; and (10) other 
facts suggesting that the prior owner might be expected to 
expand into the alleged infringer’s market.  Id. at 215.  While 
the Lapp factors originally referred to competing products, it 
is clear that, because the Lanham Act protects against the use 
of marks which cause confusion as to “goods, services, or 
                                              
 8 Because the District Court found that Capital had a 
valid and legally protectable trademark, and because that 
determination is not challenged on appeal, we do not address 
it.  Kost, 1 F.3d at 182.  
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commercial activities,” 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) (emphasis 
added), those factors apply equally to services, like those 
provided by Capital and AAM.  Thus, insofar as the case law 
uses the terms “goods” or “products” in connection with the 
Lapp factors, those terms are interchangeable with “services.”  
 
 “The Lapp factors are best understood as ‘tools to 
guide a qualitative decision.’”  Kos, 369 F.3d at 709 (quoting 
A & H, 237 F.3d at 216).   None of them in itself is 
determinative and each must be “‘weighed and balanced’” 
based on the particular facts of the case.  Id. (quoting 
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 
269 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Nevertheless, one of the 
factors, the sixth in the Lapp list, is of particular significance 
because it focuses on evidence of actual confusion, and all of 
the Lapp factors are only proxies for the fundamental 
question of whether there is a likelihood of confusion from 
the use of similar marks.  Cf. Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. 
Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A list of 
factors designed as proxies for the likelihood of confusion 
can’t supersede the statutory inquiry.”).  The controversy here 
bears primarily on that sixth factor. 
 
 In its initial preliminary injunction briefing before the 
District Court, Capital submitted evidence of eleven incidents 
of actual confusion.9  The District Court discounted that 
                                              
 9 The eleven instances of actual confusion Capital 
offered were as follows. 
 
(1) April 2009: A salesperson for the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(“RBS”) contacted Capital to ask why Capital used a different 
broker for a large security purchase identified by the code 
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*******F9, given that Capital had used the RBS salesperson 
in the past.  AAM had made the purchase at issue.    
 
(2) April 2009: JPMorgan allocated a securities purchase, 
identified by the code *******A3, to a Capital account, when 
it should have been allocated to an account owned by AAM.   
 
(3) May 2009: An attorney for Barclays negotiating Capital’s 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”) 
agreement asked whether Capital was a different entity from 
the Arrowpoint represented by Tannenbaum Helpern.  The 
Tannenbaum Helpern firm represented AAM, but never 
represented Capital.   
 
(4) June 2009: JPMorgan misallocated to a Capital account a 
securities purchase, identified by the code *******J0, that 
had been made by AAM.   
 
(5) July 2009: JPMorgan again misallocated to a Capital 
account a securities purchase, identified by the code 
*******L2, that had been made by AAM.    
 
(6) Summer 2009: Citigroup, Inc. notified Capital that 
Capital’s application to purchase TALF securities had been 
delayed due to confusion caused by AAM’s submission of an 
application for the same securities under the “Arrowpoint” 
name.  This caused Capital to lose its position in the queue to 
acquire the securities.    
 
(7) August 2009: When Capital attempted to participate in a 
corporate bond offering through RBS, it was informed that it 
would not be able to do so out of Colorado – an apparent 
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evidence because the confusion was among brokers and 
dealers, rather than being “actual customer confusion.”  
Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 
No. CV 10-161-GMS, 2014 WL 2123572, at *6 (D. Del. 
                                                                                                     
reference to AAM, which was based there.  Eventually, after 
the confusion was resolved, Capital received two-thirds of the 
allocation it initially requested.     
 
(8) Fall 2009: Morgan Stanley attempted to confirm a change 
in address from AAM’s address in Denver to Capital’s 
address in Charlotte.   
 
(9) April 2010: Citigroup sent Capital a general request for 
information regarding AAM’s “Arrowpoint Fundamental 
Opportunity Fund LP” and “Arrowpoint Structured 
Opportunity Fund LP.”   
 
(10) Summer 2010: A JPMorgan salesperson complained 
that Capital did not use JPMorgan for a securities purchase.  
The purchase had been made by AAM.   
 
(11) Summer 2010: Capital received numerous calls from 
employees at Bank of America Merrill Lynch who were 
confused about whether a trade had been executed by Capital 
or by AAM. As a result of those calls, the bank’s salespeople 
have had to communicate with the trading desk about which 
“Arrowpoint” is involved in particular transactions.  The 
bank’s employee said one such conversation lasted for 
approximately an hour because they had to determine which 
trades had been executed for Capital and for AAM, 
respectively, and which salespeople were assigned to each 
entity.   
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May 20, 2014).  Capital argues that the District Court took 
too narrow a view of what constitutes actionable confusion, 
and we agree.   
 
 The Lanham Act defines trademark infringement as 
use of a mark so similar to that of a prior user as to be “likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).  The likelihood of confusion with which 
the Lanham Act is concerned is not limited to confusion of 
products among purchasers.  For example, in Checkpoint 
Systems Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. and 
again in Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., we 
described how the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act 
broadened the scope of trademark protection.  Section 32 of 
the Lanham Act originally proscribed only the use in 
commerce of similar marks where it was “‘likely to cause 
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the 
source of origin of such goods or services.’”  Esercizio v. 
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 1946 Lanham Act).  In 1962, Congress 
deleted the terms “purchasers” and “source of origin,” 
affording Lanham Act protection more broadly when a mark 
is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.”  Kos, 369 F.3d at 711 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 295; see also 4 McCarthy 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:7 (4th ed.) 
(“Congress struck out language in the Lanham Act which 
required confusion, mistake or deception of purchasers as to 
the source of origin of such goods and services.  Several 
courts have noted this expansion of the test of infringement 
and held that it supports a finding of infringement when even 
non-purchasers are deceived.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
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 For example, in Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership 
Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1058 (3d Cir. 
1991), we reversed a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of a defendant, Country Tiles, where the 
plaintiff, Country Floors, had adduced evidence that suppliers 
and other business contacts confused the two entities.  
Specifically, Country Floors represented  “(a) that Directory 
assistance gave a caller the number for the ‘Country Tiles’ 
Manayunk Store rather than the ‘Country Floors’ Philadelphia 
showroom; (b) that [a Country Tiles] store received a past-
due notice intended for … ‘Country Floors’ … from a 
supplier whose invoice arrived in an envelope which included 
other materials intended for ‘Country Tiles;’ (c) that [the] 
Manager of the ‘Country Tiles’ Manayunk store testified that 
the number of inquiries about a connection between Country 
Floors and Country Tiles at the Manayunk store had increased 
from very few to a noticeable amount; and (d) that [an] 
interior designer …, who is not affiliated with Country 
Floors, had confused the two stores.”  Id. at 1064.  Most of 
this evidence did not involve customer confusion, but, 
nonetheless, we held that it was “evidence of actual 
confusion” sufficient to defeat summary judgment because “a 
factfinder could conclude there was actual confusion between 
the ...  names as well as the[] marks.”  Id.  
 
 Similarly, in Mid-State Aftermarket Body Parts, Inc. v. 
MQVP, Inc., 466 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 2006), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a 
summary judgment ruling that was grounded on a misguided 
likelihood-of-confusion analysis.  The district court’s decision 
had “emphasized that distributor Mid-State does not offer 
services that compete with the MQVP services protected by 
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the mark, and that Mid-State’s customers are collision shops 
who are parts end users, not the manufacturers and 
distributors who are potential purchasers of MQVP’s 
services.”  Id.  The Eighth Circuit observed, however, that 
“the Lanham Act’s unfair competition inquiry is not so 
narrow.”  Id.  Rather, that court held, “‘[c]onfusion is relevant 
when it exists in the minds of persons in a position to 
influence the purchasing decision or persons whose confusion 
presents a significant risk to the sales, goodwill, or reputation 
of the trademark owner.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 376 F.3d 8, 10 
(1st Cir. 2004)).  
 
 A number of other decisions both within our circuit 
and beyond have likewise highlighted that the Lanham Act 
extends to “the use of trademarks which are likely to cause 
confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of 
purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.”  Kos, 369 F.3d 
at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Syntex 
Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d 
Cir. 1971)); see also, e.g., Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 295 
(overly narrow view of confusion “would undervalue the 
importance of a company’s goodwill with its customers”); 
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d 
1111, 1118 (7th Cir. 1997) (context of confusion 
“immaterial” because any injury to goodwill or loss of control 
over reputation is actionable); Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. 
Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 
1996) (relevant evidence of confusion goes beyond purchaser 
confusion and includes “confusion among nonpurchasers” in 
order to “protect the manufacturer’s reputation” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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 The analysis provided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Morningside Group, Ltd. v. 
Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 
1999), is particularly relevant because, like the present case, it 
involved the highly regulated financial industry.  There, the 
plaintiff presented at trial “extensive evidence of phone calls 
and other inquiries received by its people from sophisticated 
members of the financial community, both about [the 
defendant’s] transactions and about the relationship between 
the two entities.”   Id. at 141.  “Nonetheless the district court 
discounted that evidence because it relied on an inordinately 
narrow definition of actual confusion.”  Id.  The Second 
Circuit held that, “[c]ontrary to the district court’s approach, 
evidence of actual confusion need not be limited to evidence 
of mistaken completed transactions. … [C]ourts can properly 
take into account evidence of either a diversion of sales, 
damage to goodwill, or loss of control over reputation.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Recognizing the 
particular importance of identity and reputation to financial 
firms, the Court noted that “the relevance of actual confusion 
beyond mistaken completed transactions is important ... 
because in the financial world an investor will almost never 
complete a transaction with a mistakenly identified party.  If 
nothing else, compliance with the due diligence requirement 
will normally prevent such errors.”  Id.  The Second Circuit 
warned that, before a transaction is done, “investors might be 
confused about the affiliation between two similarly named 
companies and might very well alter their behavior based on 
that confusion.”  Id.    
 
 In the present case, the District Court cited the correct 
standard when it stated that   “the [Lanham] Act covers ‘the 
use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, 
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mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers 
nor simply as to source of origin.’”  Arrowpoint, 2014 WL 
2123572, at *4 n.11 (quoting Kos, 369 F.3d at 711).   But the 
Court did not then appear to apply that standard; instead it 
repeatedly discussed the lack of customer confusion.  It said, 
for example, that “the plaintiff produced no evidence of 
actual customer confusion.  … [I]t argues that ‘broker 
dealers’ … all have been misled.”  Id. at *6.  Similarly, it 
concluded that, as a matter of law, there was no general 
likelihood of confusion, “especially since the record is devoid 
of any inference of customer confusion.”  Id. at *7 (emphasis 
added).  And, rather than recognizing the special importance 
of identity and reputation in the financial industry, it 
discounted such concerns, saying that similar marks can 
coexist because “consumers take greater care than many 
others,” and “‘prospective purchasers are unlikely to perceive 
the marks before becoming familiar with the parties’ 
businesses.’”  Id. at *5 & n.15.  That overly narrow 
interpretation of what constitutes confusion under the Lanham 
Act is contrary to our deeply rooted precedent, including our 
decisions in Checkpoint, Kos, and Country Floors.  We thus 
take this opportunity to reiterate that the Lanham Act protects 
against “the use of trademarks which are likely to cause 
confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of 
purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.”  Kos, 369 F.3d 
at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It certainly covers 
confusion created “‘in the minds of persons in a position to 
influence [a] purchasing decision or persons whose confusion 
presents a significant risk to the sales, goodwill, or reputation 
of the trademark owner.’”  Mid-State, 466 F.3d at 634 
(emphasis added) (quoting Beacon, 376 F.3d at 10).   
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 AAM cites our decision in Checkpoint, arguing that 
somehow it stands for the proposition that the “absence of 
evidence of actual consumer confusion in a purchasing 
decision” defeats a claim for infringement.  (Answering Br. at 
32.)  But that interpretation of the case is flawed.  First, our 
consideration of actual confusion evidence in Checkpoint fell 
in the middle of a lengthy discussion of whether initial-
interest confusion – as opposed to point-of-sale confusion – 
was actionable under the Lanham Act.  269 F.3d at 292-99.  
Almost all of our analysis on the issue of confusion related to 
that question, which we answered in the affirmative.10  
Second, while we expressly reserved judgment as to whether 
investor confusion is actionable – a reservation prompted by 
the lack of evidence in the case – we nevertheless noted that 
“[a]rguably, the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act 
extended actionable confusion beyond purchasers to other 
instances affecting a party’s business or goodwill.”  Id. at 
                                              
 10 In reaching the conclusion that initial-interest 
confusion was actionable, we cited to 3 McCarthy on 
Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 23.7 for the proposition 
that:  
 
In 1962, Congress struck out language in the 
Lanham Act which required confusion, mistake 
or deception of purchasers as to the source of 
origin of such goods and services.  Several 
courts have noted this expansion of the test of 
infringement and held that it supports a finding 
of infringement when even non-purchasers are 
deceived.   
 
Id. at 295 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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300.  We went on to recognize that “[i]nvestor confusion may 
well threaten a party’s business or goodwill if it would likely 
deter or inhibit a company’s ability to attract investors and 
raise capital.”  Id.  In short, Checkpoint does not stand for the 
proposition that non-purchaser confusion is not actionable 
under the Lanham Act or that it is less important than 
customer confusion.   There was simply insufficient evidence 
of any kind of confusion in Checkpoint to support a claim, 
and the case therefore does not shore up AAM’s position. 
 
 AAM also argues that the District Court’s decision did 
not turn on whether non-purchaser confusion was actionable 
but rather on whether Capital’s evidence deserved to be given 
weight.  According to AAM, the District Court discounted the 
evidence of confusion among non-purchasers because it came 
in the form of “self-serving affidavits of [Capital’s] 
employees relating hearsay.”  (Answering Br. at 28.)  And the 
District Court did in fact say that it “view[ed] many of the 
alleged inquiries about the affiliation between the parties with 
great skepticism, given the interested sources and the inability 
to cross examine the supposedly confused individuals.”  
Arrowpoint, 2014 WL 2123572, at *7 (quoting A & H, 237 
F.3d at 227).   
 
 But, even if AAM were correct that the legal error 
concerning the test for confusion had no impact on the 
District Court’s decision – a premise we do not accept – the 
argument that the Court was just weighing evidence would 
fail.  No doubt, a district court called upon to weigh evidence 
may give little credence to that which it deems unreliable, 
Kos, 369 F.3d at 719, but it must demonstrate that its decision 
in that regard is supportable.  Here, the District Court did not 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on the 
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preliminary injunction, yet it refused to credit evidence 
because of perceived credibility issues with the affiants and 
because there was no opportunity to cross examine the 
individuals who were confused.  While an evidentiary hearing 
is not always required before resolving a preliminary 
injunction, Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 
1175-76 (3d Cir. 1990) (describing various scenarios in which 
a hearing would be unnecessary), we have noted that it “may 
be improper to resolve a preliminary injunction motion on a 
paper record alone; [and] where the motion turns on a 
disputed factual issue, an evidentiary hearing is ordinarily 
required,” Kos, 369 F.3d at 719 n.16.  The record here does 
not indicate that either party expressly asked for an 
evidentiary hearing, although Capital claims that it made an 
oral motion to the District Court.  Nonetheless, because 
consideration of the injunction motion evidently was 
influenced in some significant degree by credibility issues 
and factual disputes, the District Court should have conducted 
one.  See Prof’l Plan Exam’rs of N.J., Inc. v. Lefante, 750 
F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 1984) (a district court cannot resolve a 
motion for a preliminary injunction that depends upon the 
resolution of disputed issues of fact without first holding an 
evidentiary hearing); CBS Broad., Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns 
Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Without the 
benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the district court erred in 
rejecting [the litigant’s] assertions as not credible.”).11  
                                              
 11 See also, e.g., Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning 
Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 553 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“[I]f questions of fact had been in dispute, an 
evidentiary hearing would have been required.”); Cobell v. 
Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f there are 
genuine issues of material fact raised in opposition to a 
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 Moreover, we reject AAM’s argument that the District 
Court was entitled to entirely discount hearsay affidavits at 
the preliminary injunction stage.   It is true that we have held 
that a district court may reject unreliable affidavits in 
evaluating evidence of actual confusion.  For example, in A & 
H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., we held 
that a district court was right to view “with great skepticism” 
evidence entirely coming from interested sources who were 
not subject to cross examination and were otherwise isolated 
or exceptional.  237 F.3d at 227.  We noted that “[i]t is within 
the District Court’s discretion to consider the facts, and weigh 
                                                                                                     
motion for a preliminary injunction, an evidentiary hearing is 
required.  Particularly when a court must make credibility 
determinations to resolve key factual disputes in favor of the 
moving party, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to settle 
the question on the basis of documents alone, without an 
evidentiary hearing.” (citations omitted)); Medeco Sec. Locks, 
Inc. v. Swiderek, 680 F.2d 37, 38 (7th Cir. 1981) (“It is well 
established that, in general, a motion for a preliminary 
injunction should not be resolved on the basis of affidavits 
alone.  Normally, an evidentiary hearing is required to decide 
credibility issues.”); Forts v. Ward, 566 F.2d 849, 851 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (same); Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of S. W. Va., 442 
F.2d 1261, 1269-70 (4th Cir. 1971) (same); 11A Charles 
Allen Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 
(3d ed. 2014) (noting that while an evidentiary hearing is not 
always required, there is a “strong preference … for oral 
evidence” in preliminary injunction proceedings and that 
most courts require an evidentiary hearing where there are 
disputed facts). 
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them.”  Id.  And, we have made similar statements in other 
cases.  See, e.g., Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l 
Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 122 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In 
general, actual confusion evidence collected by employees of 
a party in a trademark action must be viewed with skepticism 
because it tends to be biased or self-serving.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 298 
(“[T]he District Court properly took into account the potential 
bias of Checkpoint Systems’s employees who testified 
[regarding actual confusion].”).  None of those cases, 
however, were decided upon an application for a preliminary 
injunction; rather, they were decisions made at later stages of 
each case.  That procedural distinction explains why the self-
serving hearsay affidavits in Kos, a case involving a 
preliminary injunction, were sufficient, but the same kind 
evidence was not enough to sustain a judgment for the 
plaintiff in Checkpoint.  
 
In rejecting the argument that hearsay affidavits were 
inadequate to entitle a movant to preliminary relief in Kos, we 
explained that temporary injunctions are “customarily granted 
on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence 
that is less complete than in a trial” or at summary judgment 
because there is no “rule in the preliminary injunction context 
akin to the strict rules governing the form of affidavits that 
may be considered in summary judgment proceedings.”  369 
F.3d at 718.  Cf. E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Prods., 
Inc., 538 F.3d 185, 196 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We have 
explained the importance of the distinction between the 
preliminary injunction and summary judgment stages of 
litigation ... .  The distinction between the two standards 
remains as important in the context of weighing the results of 
a survey as in making credibility determinations... .”); 11A 
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Charles Allen Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2949 (3d ed. 2014) (“[I]t is not surprising that in practice 
affidavits usually are accepted on a preliminary injunction 
motion without regard to the strict standards of Rule 56(c)(4), 
and that hearsay evidence also may be considered.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  It also appears that at least some of these allegedly 
unsubstantiated affidavits actually had email communications 
pertaining to the confusion attached as exhibits.  We offer no 
opinion as to whether the District Court should credit those 
submissions, but it is not enough to simply dismiss them as 
self-serving.  One would hardly expect them to be otherwise.  
No party is likely to submit evidence that does not serve its 
case.  
 
 In sum, despite credibility questions, the District Court 
failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, or to adequately set 
forth its rationale for discounting Capital’s evidence, or to 
hear oral argument.  On this record, those failings amount to 
error.   
 
 Because we conclude that the District Court erred in its 
actual confusion analysis and its treatment of Capital’s 
evidence of confusion, we need not address the remaining 
Lapp factors.12  We agree with Capital that the District 
                                              
 12 The District Court found that the length of time the 
defendant used the mark without actual confusion arising is 
neutral because “[t]he court is unable to thoroughly assess 
this factor given the nature of the alleged ‘actual confusion’” 
Arrowpoint, 2014 WL 2123572, at *7; customer care and 
sophistication, “strongly favor[ed] the defendants [AAM]” 
Id.; AAM adopted the mark in good faith and thus that factor 
favored AAM; channels of advertising factor favored 
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Court’s overly narrow view of what constitutes confusion 
under the Lanham Act affected its analysis of the other Lapp 
factors and the District Court should revisit its rulings in the 
first instance in light of the forgoing discussion.13  Kos, 369 
F.3d at 712 (stating that normally the application of an 
incorrect legal standard results in a remand for the district 
court to rule in the first instance using the correct standard).14   
                                                                                                     
defendant because the parties use different media; and the 
customer bases are similar but because the parties offered 
“distinctly different investment management strategies to 
generally different classes of investors” that factor favored 
defendants.  Id. at *8.  
 
 13 While the delay in this case is troubling – we are 
dealing with an application for preliminary relief dating back 
four years – we reject the suggestion that the District Judge 
cannot ably and fairly address the case.  Our reasons for 
denying the request for reassignment are set forth herein.  See 
infra pp. 35-37. 
 
 14 We do, however, take this opportunity to note some 
difficulty with the District Court’s analysis of AAM’s intent 
in adopting the mark.  AAM admitted that it knew Capital 
was using the “Arrowpoint” name in the insurance industry 
before it began using it.  That admission was necessary 
because, prior to adopting the “Arrowpoint” name, AAM had 
conducted a trademark search that revealed that Capital was 
already using “Arrowpoint” in connection with both 
insurance and financial services.  AAM said it did not think 
Capital’s use of “Arrowpoint” for insurance services would 
preclude it from using “Arrowpoint” for investment services 
and the District Court accepted that explanation, finding that 
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 Because the District Court determined that Capital 
could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, it did 
not analyze the remaining three factors for preliminary relief.  
If, on remand, the District Court reaches a different 
conclusion on the likelihood of success, it will, of course, 
need to address one or more of those factors as it assesses 
Capital’s request for an injunction.  See, e.g., McNeil 
Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 
350, 369 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will therefore remand for the 
District Court to consider whether [Appellant] establishes a 
likelihood of success on the remaining elements of trade dress 
infringement under the Lanham Act, as well as the remaining 
factors for preliminary injunctive relief.”); Allegheny Energy, 
Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 167 (3d Cir. 1999) (“On 
remand, the District Court should reassess – in light of this 
opinion – the three remaining factors in the four-factor 
                                                                                                     
AAM adopted the name in good faith.  Since insurance 
companies invest customer premiums in various financial 
instruments as a primary source of profits, however, see, e.g., 
Robert McMenamin et al., What do U.S. life insurers invest 
in? The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed 
Letter No. 309 at tbl. 1 (April 2013) (explaining that, in the 
fourth quarter of 2011, life insurers held about $3.5 trillion in 
assets, over $3.3 trillion of which were invested in various 
financial instruments); see also Opening Br. at 5 (“[Capital]’s 
primary source of income is the investment of its reserves in 
fixed-income securities”), the closely related character of the 
markets for insurance services and for investment services 
warranted closer consideration.  Again, we do not have any 
fixed opinion on this point, but the answer does not appear to 
us as evident as it seems to have been to the District Court. 
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determination of whether a preliminary injunction should 
issue.”); Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 500 
(8th Cir. 2013) (“The district court is in the best position to 
evaluate all of the evidence and weigh the factors to 
determine whether the injunction should issue.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  We offer no opinion as to whether 
Capital is entitled to preliminary relief. 15   
 
 B. Motion to Supplement16 
 
 Capital also challenges the District Court’s denial of 
its motions to supplement the record with additional evidence 
of actual confusion.  Specifically, while its motion for 
                                              
 15 It must be said, however, that, directly contrary to 
Capital’s suggestion that a showing of actual confusion 
creates a presumption of irreparable harm, we recently held in 
light of two recent Supreme Court cases, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), and Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), 
that “a party bringing a claim under the Lanham Act is not 
entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a 
preliminary injunction and must demonstrate that irreparable 
harm is likely.”  Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., 
Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 206 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
 16 We review for abuse of discretion the District 
Court’s decision on the motions to supplement the record.  
See Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1998) (“We 
also find no abuse of discretion – the appropriate question – 
in the district court’s refusal to allow the Voters to 
supplement the record … .” (citation omitted)).  
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preliminary relief was pending, Capital sought to supplement 
the record twice. On August 20, 2012, it filed a motion for 
leave to supplement the record with nine additional instances 
of what it describes as actual confusion.17  Capital later 
                                              
17 The additional confusion evidence consisted of the 
following. 
 
(1) Spring 2011: An analyst at Morgan Stanley contacted 
Capital to request an allocation for a bond trade.  When 
asked to verify that the trade was for Capital, the analyst 
advised that it actually was for “Arrowpoint Asset” and 
asked whether Capital was affiliated with Arrowpoint Asset.  
(App. at 205.) 
 
(2) Summer 2011: Capital was contacted by a representative 
of Goldman Sachs and asked to confirm and allocate a trade 
placed by an employee of AAM.   
 
(3) Fall 2011: A Barclays representative commented on 
Capital’s attendance at an upcoming securities conference.  
Capital had not yet signed up to attend.  The Barclays 
representative explained that she had seen a list of attendees 
that included “Arrowpoint Partners.”  (Id. at 182-184, 189). 
 
(4) Spring 2012: While attending a conference, Capital 
representatives introduced themselves to two employees of 
Solamere Advisors, an investment and wealth management 
firm.  The Solamere Advisors employees said they had heard 
of Capital and had looked at the company’s “funds” while 
evaluating funds for clients.  (Id. at 191-92.)  Only AAM 
offers such funds.  
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(5) Spring 2012: Capital placed a multi-million dollar order 
for a new issue bond offered by RBS, Deutsche Bank, and 
UBS, but received no allocation in that offering because the 
syndicate desk handling the transaction had mistakenly 
believed it was placed by “the Arrowpoint in Colorado,” a 
“fast money” account or a “hedge fund.”  (Id. at 194-95.)  
Capital’s contact at RBS explained the syndicate desk’s 
mistaken assumption, but by that time there was no way to 
rectify the mistake. 
 
(6) Summer 2012: A Credit Suisse salesperson called 
Capital to inquire about a report from his syndicate desk that 
“Arrowpoint” – evidently AAM – had placed a multi-million 
dollar order for a security. (Id. at 181-82.) 
 
(7) Summer 2012: A Wells Fargo salesperson asked 
whether Capital had placed an order for several million 
dollars in securities.  Upon investigating, the salesperson 
reported that the buyer was “Arrowpoint Asset Management 
in Denver.”  (Id. at 181.) 
 
(8) Summer 2012: A Morgan Stanley representative 
contacted Capital to confirm a multimillion dollar fixed-
income trade that had been booked to “Arrowpoint Capital.”  
(Id. at 204.)  The representative said the trader was “Kaelyn” 
at telephone number (303) ***-****.  The telephone number 
was to AAM’s Denver office for one of AAM’s traders.   
 
(9) Summer 2012: A representative of Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch contacted Capital by email to inquire about a 
trade that had been rejected.  The email, with the salutation 
“Team,” had two additional addressees, both employed by 
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discovered at least six more examples of actual confusion and 
moved to supplement the record a second time on April 15, 
2013.18  The District Court denied both motions – on 
                                                                                                     
AAM.  (Id. at 203-04, 208-09.)  The bank representative then 
called Capital to ask whether it had another entity, because 
she noticed that the trade said “Arrowpoint Asset 
Management.”  (Id.)  She later reported AAM had confirmed 
“this was their trade.”  (Id.) 
 
18 That evidence consisted of the following.  
 
(1) Fall 2012: Capital asked its contact at State Street Bank to 
provide a list of authorized signers for its bank account.  The 
bank contact forwarded a list of authorized signers consisting 
of two pages.  The first page listed authorized signatories for 
Capital and the second page listed authorized signatories for 
AAM. When informed of this error, the bank contact 
explained that the information he forwarded had been pulled 
from an electronic database through a search by name – 
indicating that the employee searched for “Arrowpoint.”   
 
(2) Fall 2012: An RBS manager contacted Capital about a 
money difference in a multi-million dollar trade.   Capital 
learned that the trade had been made by AAM because the 
customer was identified as “ARROWPOINT ASSET 
MGMT-GS.”   
 
(3) Fall 2012: Capital and Barclays jointly participated in a 
trial to evaluate a risk management system.  Barclays set up 
access for Capital’s employees, but mistakenly listed the firm 
name as “Arrowpoint Asset Management, LLC.”  When 
asked about the mistake, the contact at Barclays responded 
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that he thought Capital and AAM were both part of the same 
entity, which he called “Arrowpoint.”   
 
(4) Winter 2013: A Morgan Stanley employee called Capital 
to get account details for trades it had allocated to Capitals’ 
account.  Capital could not identify these trades by the 
numbers given, so it asked for the name of the trader.  The 
name provided was that of a trader employed by AAM.  The 
Morgan Stanley employee, upon realizing this, stated that he 
must have been confused, and that the trades must have been 
made by the other Arrowpoint.   
 
(5) Winter 2013: A Credit Suisse employee contacted 
Capital to ask whether it had submitted orders in a deal in 
which Wells Fargo or Barclays were other leads. The 
employee said his syndicate desk had seen an “Arrowpoint” 
in the other banks’ order books and wanted to know whether 
this referred to Capital or AAM.   
 
(6) Winter 2013: A Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets 
employee contacted Capital to say he had learned from his 
syndicate desk that Capital had placed a multi-million dollar 
order for an asset-backed security.  Although Capital had 
analyzed this offering, it had not yet decided to buy. The bank 
employee later reported that the order actually was placed by 
an “Arrowpoint” in Denver, and he apologized for the trouble 
caused by his confusion.   
 
(7) Spring 2013: A reporter for Creditflux, an independent 
report on credit trading and investing, contacted Capital to 
confirm a tip from market sources that “Arrowpoint” was 
about to get involved in structured credit by launching a 
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September 18, 2013 and March 25, 2014, respectively – 
without explanation.   
 
 Capital argues that the delay in deciding the motion for 
preliminary relief necessitated the filing of supplemental 
information and that the District Court had no basis for 
denying the motions to supplement because the evidence to 
be submitted was probative of actual confusion.  See Fuji 
Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 
F.2d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that “there is simply no 
precedent” for the “total disregard of evidence of actual 
confusion”); McCarthy § 23:13 (“No matter how convinced a 
trial judge may be of the absence of any likelihood of 
confusion, he or she must at least listen to evidence presented 
of actual confusion.”).  AAM counters that the District Court 
rejected the evidence because it was more of the same self-
serving hearsay that the Court had previously declined to 
accept and that AAM would have been prejudiced by having 
to respond to the additional evidence of confusion nearly 
seventeen months after the record closed.     
 
                                                                                                     
collateral debt obligation, known as a “CLO.”  Capital had no 
such intention.  When asked whether he was sure he had the 
right company, the reporter responded by asking whether he 
was speaking with “Arrowpoint Capital.”  Capital asked the 
reporter whether he was seeking the Denver-based AAM, and 
the reporter confirmed that he was in fact looking for the 
Denver-based firm.  A few weeks later, a Business Wire news 
item reported that AAM had launched a CLO.  The item 
referred to AAM’s company name as “Arrowpoint” and to the 
new product as “Arrowpoint CLO 2013-1.”     
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 We are faced with the difficulty of evaluating the 
District Court’s rulings in this regard when they are wholly 
unexplained.  It would ordinarily be within the District 
Court’s discretion to set a deadline for submissions in 
deciding a temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction and to refuse to accept supplemental filings 
submitted after that deadline – although the significant delay 
in this case would give us cause to doubt the wisdom and 
viability of such a decision if that is what happened here.  On 
the other hand, if the District Court refused to grant the 
motions because the affidavits contained hearsay, it would 
likely have erred for the reasons we have already described.  
Because we are unable to discern the basis for the District 
Court’s rulings on the motions to supplement and because we 
are vacating the denial of the preliminary injunction on other 
grounds, we will also vacate the denial of the motions to 
supplement and ask the District Court to revisit its ruling in 
light of this opinion.   
 
 C. Motion for Reassignment19  
 
 Finally, Capital asks us to reassign the case to a 
different district judge on remand, arguing that the delay in 
ruling on the motion for preliminary relief and the adverse 
evidentiary rulings call into question the judge’s impartiality.  
We strongly disagree.  
 
 Reassignment is “an exceptional remedy, one that we 
weigh seriously and order sparingly.”  United States v. 
                                              
 19 Our authority to direct the reassignment of a case on 
remand is based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2106.   
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1411 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012).  “To warrant 
reassignment under § 455(a), a case generally must involve 
apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source, meaning 
something above and beyond judicial rulings or opinions 
formed in presiding over the case.”  United States v. Bergrin, 
682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 2012).  “Our supervisory powers 
under § 2106, however, also permit reassignment and are not 
necessarily constrained by that limitation.”  Id.  
Notwithstanding the differences between the standards for 
reassignment under § 455(a) and § 2106, we have typically 
reviewed requests for reassignment under both provisions 
applying a standard that calls for reassignment when “‘a 
reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would 
conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 
194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
 
   Here, it is clear that reassignment is not warranted.  
We have never held that delay alone merits reassignment.  
Further, the cases Capital cites for the proposition that delay 
alone can warrant reassignment – Brooks v. Central Bank of 
Birmingham, 717 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1983) and Yang 
v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 522, 527 (7th Cir. 1998) – are 
inapposite.  In Brooks, the court of appeals ordered 
reassignment because the district court repeatedly 
demonstrated hostility toward certain provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and ruled that the appointment of counsel 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment.  717 F.2d at 1342-43.  
Similarly, the reassignment in Yang was not based on the 
district court’s delay, but instead was pursuant to a local rule 
providing for reassignment whenever a case is remanded for a 
new trial.  Yang, 137 F.3d at 527 (ordering reassignment 
because of Seventh Cir. L.A.R. 36).   
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 Further, adverse rulings – even if they are erroneous – 
are not in themselves proof of prejudice or bias.  See, e.g., 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias 
or partiality motion [under § 455(a)]” since they rarely 
“evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ... 
when no extrajudicial source is involved”); Securacomm 
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“[A] party’s displeasure with legal rulings does 
not form an adequate basis for recusal.”); Jones v. Pittsburgh 
Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“Disagreement with a judge’s determinations certainly 
cannot be equated with the showing required to so reflect on 
his impartiality as to dictate recusal.”).   
 
 Indeed, after careful consideration of the record, we 
find no evidence of bias in the district judge’s handling of the 
case.  To the contrary, the judge appears to have been 
completely impartial and we have high confidence in him as a 
jurist.  Because we are satisfied that he will handle this case 
in a fair and expeditious manner, the request for reassignment 
will be denied.    
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will vacate the rulings at 
issue and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
